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Abstract
The Determinants of Liquidity in the Corporate Bond Markets:
An Application of Latent Liquidity
We present a new measure of liquidity known as “latent liquidity” and
apply it to a unique corporate bond database to discern the characteristics of
bonds that lead to higher liquidity. Unlike conventional measures of liquidity,
such as trading volume and bid-ask spreads, our measure of liquidity does not
use transactional information; instead, it uses information about the owner-
ship of securities to measure the accessibility of a security by a securities
dealer. Therefore, our measure has the important advantage of being able to
assess liquidity for markets with extremely low trading activity, where trans-
actions data are insufficient to compute traditional measures of liquidity, but
where liquidity is still an important issue. We relate our proposed latent
liquidity measure to bond characteristics such as amount outstanding, credit
quality, maturity, age, optionality and industry segment. In the liquid seg-
ments of the market, where trade-based measures of liquidity are available,
our proposed measure exhibits similar relationships to bond characteristics
as the trade-based measures. However, latent liquidity exhibits greater con-
sistency in terms of its relationships with bond characteristics, over time.
In addition, in the illiquid segment of the market, the relationships of our
measure to bond characteristics are also similar to what we observe in the
liquid segment. This leads us to believe that our measure is a viable measure
of liquidity, when trade-based measures are unavailable.
1 Introduction
Any investor holding a security or considering the purchase of a security
is exposed to liquidity, or, more precisely, the lack of it. The conventional
“reduced-form” definition of liquidity is the gap between the fundamental
value of a security and the price at which the security is actually transacted:
high liquidity implies that this gap is small, and vice versa. In this paper,
our goal is to understand the determinants of liquidity and its cross-sectional
variability in the context of relatively illiquid markets. However, while liq-
uidity is easy to define in theoretical terms, its empirical measurement in an
accurate and reliable manner is quite difficult, except in markets that are
relatively very liquid. This is because most commonly used metrics of liquid-
ity rely on transactional information, such as volume and trading spreads,
with relatively high frequency, which are clearly unavailable when the as-
set in question is illiquid. For this reason, we first propose a measure for
liquidity that does not require such transactions data. We call this measure
latent liquidity, since it measures liquidity the way a typical “sell-side” dealer
thinks about liquidity: it measures the accessibility of a security from sources
where the security is currently being held. We apply this new measure of
liquidity to try to understand the determinants of liquidity in one of the most
well-known, but illiquid markets in the world - the market for U.S. corporate
bonds.
Researchers have been developing theoretical models of liquidity for over
two decades now.1 Indeed, this is a central concern of the market microstruc-
ture literature, which can broadly be split into two strands: models of in-
formation cost and models of inventory cost. Models based on information
depend on the costs of trading against informed traders to generate a bid-ask
spread. Copeland and Galai (1983) pioneered this literature in a one-trade
framework, based on an insight provided by Bagehot (pseud.) (1971). This
approach was then extended to sequential trade models by Glosten and Mil-
grom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987), among others. The seminal
paper by Kyle (1985) extended this literature considerably by incorporating
the strategic behavior of an informed trader. Subsequently, papers by Ad-
mati and Pfeiderer (1988, 1989), Foster and Viswanathan (1990), and Seppi
(1990) all extended this literature to consider the strategic behavior of un-
informed (or liquidity) traders as well. Over the last fifteen years, a series
1Readers should consult O’Hara (2004) for a more thorough review of this literature.
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of information models have built on these fundamental papers and extended
them to incorporate many other factors.
The first paper to consider inventory costs was by Garman (1976). Ami-
hud and Mendelson (1980) extended Garman’s model by incorporating in-
ventory and time-variation of inventory (and its link to price changes). Stoll
(1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981) instead approached the problem by analyzing
the dealer’s objective function in more detail. Specifically, they modelled the
dealer as a provider of immediacy and focused on the required compensa-
tion for this service. Since then, aside from a few scattered papers such as
O’Hara and Oldfield (1986), very little attention has been focused on the role
of inventory costs in transactions prices, although it is recognized as a factor
affecting liquidity and spreads.
The broad empirical issue of liquidity has been covered by many papers in
both the equity and bond market literatures. For example, in the equity mar-
kets, questions receiving a great deal of attention recently are firstly, whether
liquidity differentials explain the cross-sectional variation in returns, and
secondly, whether liquidity risk is priced.2 Amihud and Mendelson (1986),
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam
(1998), Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam
(2000) have all found positive relationships between stock returns and overall
liquidity as measured by spreads, depth, and volume. Meanwhile Chordia,
Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) find a negative relationship between
liquidity and expected returns, while Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) find no re-
lationship. Finally, Huberman and Halka (2001) and Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) have examined the more relevant question of whether liquidity risk is
a systematic factor.
Several authors have investigated alternative measures of liquidity, which
do not rely on high-frequency data. Typically, these metrics rely only on
daily volume and return data and can be related to Kyle’s (1985) concept of
2Liquidity risk is the uncertainty of how wide or narrow the gap between fundamental
value and the transactions price of a security will be at any point in time. For all investors,
current and potential, liquidity risk is a real risk that they bear, and hence may be ”priced,”
if it has a systematic component. Every transaction is essentially a negative NPV project
for the “buy-side” investor, because she is always transacting at a price worse than the
security’s fundamental value. However, if the investor knew how negative the NPV would
be, then this would not be a risk - the investor could simply perform his asset allocation
optimization by factoring in the transaction costs. The risk comes from not knowing how
far off the investor will transact in relation to the fundamental value of the asset she is
buying or selling.
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the price impact of trading. Examples include the Amivest and the Amihud
(2002) measures that are based on absolute return and trading volume. The
relationship between these measures (and their variants) and microstructure-
based measures has been investigated by Hasbrouck (2005) who shows that
the Amihud measure is a robust measure of liqudity. Using this measure,
Amihud (2002) shows there is an illiquidity premium in stock returns as the
expected market illiquidity is correlated with stock excess return. Acharya
and Pedersen (2005) also use this measure to investigate the various channels
of the liquidity effect on stock returns in a unified liquidity-adjusted capital
asset pricing model.
In the debt markets, much of the literature on liquidity has focused on
the transactional characteristics of corporate debt. For example, Chakravarty
and Sarkar (1999), Hong and Warga (2000), Schultz (2001), and Hotchkiss,
Warga, and Jostava (2002) have all used the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC) database to study bid-ask spreads and trading
volume in corporate bonds. Meanwhile Hotchkiss and Ronen (1999) and
Alexander, Edwards, and Ferri (2000) have used the Fixed Income Pricing
System (FIPS) database of high-yield bonds, collected by the National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers (NASD) to study various aspects of liquidity
and informational efficiency in the corporate bond market.
The role of liquidity in the context of credit markets has been studied by
several authors, who attempt to explain the yield spread on corporate bonds
or credit default swaps. Several authors, including Duffee (1999), Duffie and
Singleton (1997) Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001), Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein and Martin (2001), Huang and Huang (2003), Eom, Helwege and
Huang (2004), Liu, Longstaff and Mandell (2004), and Longstaff, Mithal and
Neis (2005), present evidence of non-default component of these spreads,
and attribute at least part of it to illiquidity effects. However, in the absence
of direct measures of liquidity for most corporate bonds, most researchers,
so far, have been forced to rely on proxies such as age, notional amount
oustanding, industry category, and credit risk. (In the case of the most
liquid bonds, some data on bid-ask spreads is used, but this approach is
clearly biased in favor of the most liquid bonds, given the lack of trading in
most US corporate bonds, as we document below.) While these measure may
be correlated with liquidity, it would be far better to obtain a more direct
measure of liquidity, since these proxies may be quite imperfect.
A common feature among all the empirical papers written on liquidity,
irrespective of the markets studied, is that they use transactions data, such as
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trading volume and the bid-ask spread, to measure liquidity. This approach
is feasible in markets that are relatively liquid and have relatively continuous
trading activity. However, this is not a realistic option, in general, since the
most interesting markets to study liquidity, or more precisely, the lack of it,
are those where liquidity is a problem, i.e., in asset markets that lack liquidity,
such as the real estate market, the art market, the corporate bond market, to
name a few. In general, most assets in these markets do not trade regularly;
hence transactions data are very sparse, for all but a handful of the assets in
these markets, since there is no trading activity for the bulk of the assets for
several consecutive months. Any results from such studies are consequently
skewed in the direction of the most liquid segment of these markets, and
may not necessarily apply to the market as a whole. Hence, conventional
measures of liquidity such as the bid-ask spread and trade count are difficult
to employ in these markets, except for the most liquid assets in these markets.
For example, in the US corporate bond market, the median bond trades much
less than once every year, as compared with the US equity markets, where
the median stock trades once every few minutes. Therefore, studies that use
proxies of liquidity based on transactions data in these markets inevitably
end up focusing on only the most liquid securities or markets - a classic case
of looking for lost keys under the lamp post, where the light is shining, rather
than where they were lost. Clearly, what is needed, therefore, is a measure
of liquidity that does not rely on transactions data; such a measure would be
ideal for studying liquidity in markets where the issue is of greatest interest
- those that are relatively illiquid.
In order to address the question of liquidity in relatively illiquid markets,
we construct a new liquidity measure that assesses the accessibility of a se-
curity, rather than its trading characteristics, and apply this measure to the
US corporate bond market.3 Since corporate bonds trade in a dealer net-
work, dealers rely on being able to access their “buy-side” clients’ holdings
either to purchase or sell bonds. If a bond is readily accessible, meaning a
dealer can contact one of a number of “buy-side” clients and obtain the bond
easily, the bond can be thought of as potentially liquid, even though it may
not actually trade very much. Specifically, we conjecture that if a bond issue
is held primarily by investors with high portfolio turnover, the bond may be
3We use the corporate bond market as an important example of an illiquid market,
but it should be clear that the liquidity concepts and measures discussed here apply, more
generally, to any security.
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thought of as more accessible - essentially, it is easier for a dealer to call one
of the investors holding this bond and convince them to sell it at a reasonable
spread in relation to its fundamental value. On the other hand, if a bond is-
sue is held primarily by investors with extremely low portfolio turnover, such
as long term buy-and-hold investors (e.g. insurance companies), it is more
difficult for dealers to convince them to sell it. Thus, our measure of liquid-
ity is based on a bond’s accessibility. To apply this concept, we construct a
statistic known as latent liquidity, which measures the accessibility of a bond
to dealers, based on the aggregate trading characteristics of investors holding
bonds.4
With a suitable measure of liquidity available, we then apply this measure
to the US corporate bond market to determine the drivers of liquidity in this
market.5 We analyze various characteristics of a bond, such as its credit
rating, its maturity, etc., and determine whether or not each characteristic
contributes to higher or lower liquidity, or accessibility, for that bond. Since
the corporate bond market is essentially an over-the-counter market, with
a large number of dealers, obtaining data on this market is quite difficult.
No single dealer has enough market share, and, therefore, handles enough
transactions for a meaningful analysis to be conducted. For this reason, our
dataset comes from the world’s largest custody bank, which holds data from
a large number of “buy-side” clients. As part of their custody process, these
banks record the transactions conducted by their clients; thus, the largest
custody banks essentially “see” across the transactions databases of multiple
dealers. While not being able to access data on all of the transactions in the
corporate bond market, the largest custodians do record a substantial part
of it. More importantly, the custodians become aware of only institutional
rather than inter-dealer trading; thus, the database we use constitutes a more
relevant portion of the trading universe (for the purpose of studying liquidity
effects). As a result, the findings of the paper are much more appropriate for
institutional trading and bond holdings.
In our empirical study, we find that the credit quality, the age of a bond,
4Our measure captures the “ease of buying” a particular bond. It does not directly
measure the “ease of selling” the bond, since it does not measure the potential interest in
such a bond. However, to the extent that holders of particular bonds may be interested
in adding to their holdings, it measures the “ease of selling,” albeit indirectly.
5Prior to the availability of transactions databases such as the NAIC or FIPS, studies
typically employed yield spreads or issue size as proxies for liquidity. See, for example,
Sarig and Warga (1989), Blume, Keim, and Patel (1991), and Crabbe and Turner (1995).
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the size of a bond issue, the original maturity value of a bond at issue date,
and provisions such as a call, put, or convertible options all have a strong
impact on liquidity. In these regressions, we use four different measures of
liquidity as a dependent variable: our latent liquidity measure and three
transaction-based measures, which are all alternative formulations of trading
volume. We observe that when we restrict ourselves to the bonds in the
database that have a relatively high degree of trading volume (because these
are the only ones for which we can construct the transaction-based measures
of liquidity), the results from the regressions are similar whether we use la-
tent liquidity or the transaction-based measures. Along with the many tests
we run on latent liquidity, this result gives us some comfort that the latent
liquidity statistic appears to be a good proxy for liquidity. Furthermore, we
also run the same empirical tests on the entire database (including the bonds
that do not trade often enough for transaction-based liquidity measures to
be calculated), and we find similar results. From this exercise, we conclude
the following: when there is frequent trading and transactions data are avail-
able, our latent liquidity measure is as good as the transaction-based liquidity
measures; so one can use any one of these measures. However, when there is
infrequent trading and transaction-based measures simply cannot be calcu-
lated, our latent liquidity measure provides a good proxy for the liquidity of
a security.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The second section introduces
the database we use and provides some indications of how representative it
is of the market as a whole, in terms of both holdings and transactions. It
also provides some statistics on the trading frequency of bonds in our sample.
This section also discusses the composition of the database in terms of various
bond characteristics, such as issue size, age, maturity, industry segment etc.
Finally, the section concludes with a precise definition of latent liquidity
along with some graphs of the relationship between the proposed measure
and key bond characteristics. In the third section, we present the results of
a series of informal tests to check whether latent liquidity provides a good
measure of liquidity. These tests relate the characteristics of bonds to both
latent liquidity and two transaction-based measures of liquidity, for the most
liquid segment of the market, where the latter measures can be constructed.
We also present the results for the relationship between latent liquidity and
the bond characteristics for the less liquid segment of our sample to provide
a sense of how different these are are from the more liquid segment. The
fourth section concludes.
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2 Liquidity Measurement and Data
While the corporate bond market appears to be an ideal market to study
liquidity, particularly the drivers of liquidity, two primary reasons explain the
lack of rigorous empirical research on liquidity in corporate bond markets.
The first is that the corporate bond market is a dealer market (essentially
an over-the counter (OTC) market); hence, no central data source exists for
all the transactions occurring in the market.6 Therefore, it is difficult for
any one entity to assemble a comprehensive bond transactions database of
the whole market. The second problem relates to the computation of the
metrics of liquidity. The definition of an illiquid market is that very little
trading exists, often for several months at a time. Therefore, the question
arises as to how to measure the degree of a corporate bond’s illiquidity, i.e.,
what statistic can be used to proxy for a bond’s illiquidity?
2.1 The US Corporate Bond Database
Since no single comprehensive source of trading data exists for the US cor-
porate bond market as a whole, one has to rely on data from a sub-set of
the market. One could go to an individual dealer and collect and analyze
the transactions in which that dealer participates. However, this approach
leaves open the possibility of biases: for example, a particular dealer might
be a market leader in the high-yield segment of the market, in which case the
database the researcher puts together from that dealer’s transactions will be
biased towards high-yield bonds. To avoid this problem, we use the databases
of the world’s largest custodian, State Street Corporation (SSC). The pri-
mary functions of a custodian are to provide trade clearance and settlement,
the safekeeping of securities, and providing asset servicing such as dividend
collection, proxy voting, and accounting and tax services. A custodian is
not tied to any one dealer: its customers are the owners of assets, not the
broker/dealers. Asset owners typically use multiple dealers to execute their
6The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) has initiated a program known
as the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), in which the individual mem-
bers of the NASD report all of their corporate bond transactions. These transactions are
aggregated into a common, market-wide database. However, the TRACE effort is not
comprehensive, as yet; furthermore, because the program is relatively new, a reasonably
long history will not be available for many years. More importantly, as we shall see later
on, our measure of liquidity also requires information regarding the holdings of bonds by
different investors. This is, clearly, not available in the TRACE database.
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transactions, but typically use one custodian for all their holdings. Since a
custodian is not associated with any single dealer, its data aggregates trans-
actions across multiple dealers. Therefore, the transactions database of a
custodian should be much larger and more comprehensive than that of any
one individual dealer; thus, the database is likely to be much more represen-
tative of the aggregate market, particularly relating to institutional investors.
Furthermore, a custodian’s database contains information about both trans-
actions as well as the holdings of various investors, which will be used in
combination in constructing our liquidity measure.
2.2 A Comparative Analysis of the US Corporate Bond
Database
The SSB holdings database represents a comparatively large sample of the
whole market for US corporate bonds in terms of both holdings as well as
transactions. It also covers a relatively long history from January 1994 to
December 2004.7 We first present some evidence of the representative nature
of the database in relation to the universe of US corporate bonds.
Table 1A presents the composition of the bonds in our database broken
down by industry, as compared to the total universe of US corporate bonds.
The universe is defined based on data from Reuters, for the amount of bonds
outstanding, as of December 31, 2004. As can be seen from the table, which
presents the amounts outstanding in the various industry categories, our
total sample represents about 14.45% of the whole market.8 We can see
from this table that our database provides a very good representation of the
cross-section of bonds outstanding. The only deviation occurs with banks,
which comprise 15.49% of our database, but represent only 12.16% of the
total universe of bonds. In turn, our database is slightly underweighted in
the electric power and manufacturing industries.
Table 1B presents a similar disaggregation of our data in relation to the
universe of US corporate bonds, this time based on Moody’s credit rating.
Our database’s credit quality composition exhibits a somewhat more devi-
ation from the universe as compared to the industry composition in Table
7Unfortunately, some of the bond characteristics were not able in the database for the
entire period. Consequently, we have restricted our empirical analysis to the period from
January 1999 to December 2004.
8We use the industry categories defined by Reuters.
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1A. However, our database still remains reasonably representative of the uni-
verse, with our data being over-represented in the high quality (Aaa and Aa)
segment (7.55% and 19.92%, in the SSB sample, respectively, compared with
5.72% and 16.19% in the universe) and under-represented in the low quality
(C and ungraded) segment (1.29% and 2.88%, respectively, compared with
3.10% and 6.55% in the universe). This is not surprising, considering that
our holdings database consists of portfolios of institutional investors.
Table 1C presents the disaggregated statistics for our database in relation
to the universe, based on maturity. Again, our database remains reasonably
representative of the universe, although it is somewhat under-represented
for the long maturities (greater than 10 years) - around 18.16% of the SSB
sample, compared to 24.69% in the universe - and slightly over-represented
for very short maturities (less than 1 year) - 18.89% in the SSB sample, as
opposed to 15.46% in the whole market.
We turn next to the transaction statistics for our database versus the
whole market, based on data from the Bond Market Association (BMA).9
This is presented in Table 2. We cannot draw conclusions about the rep-
resentativeness of the trades in our database for the various cross-sections,
due to the lack of comparable benchmarks for corporate bond transactions in
the total universe. However, we do see that the database comprises over 9%
of the average daily trading volume in US corporate bonds.10 Furthermore,
this level does not fluctuate very much through time. The stability of trading
volume gives some indication that the cross-sectional patterns, presented in
Tables 1A, 1B and 1C, are fairly stable.
Based on the above comparisons, we can conclude that our database is
reasonably representative of the whole market for US corporate bonds. This
conclusion holds in terms of the broad characteristics of the bond market,
both for the cross-sectional holdings of the bonds and the way this cross-
section moves through time. We conjecture, therefore, that the conclusions
we draw from this database should have relevance for the market as a whole.
9Unfortunately, this database does not provide transactions statistics disaggregated
into the various categories mentioned earlier. Further, the statistics are available only on
a monthly basis, and that too, only since January 2003.
10We believe that this figure may be on the conservative side, since we generally notice
only one side of a trade, in our database, as opposed to both sides in the market, at large,
had such data been available.
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2.3 Characteristics of the US Corporate Bond Data-
base
Our goal in this paper is to conduct a broad analysis of the illiquidity in
the US corporate bond market, based on the transactions in our database.
Table 3 provides data on the illiquidity of the corporate bond market based
on the frequency of trading to support our claim that this market is highly
illiquid. We see from this table that, across the years, there are very few
bonds that trade every day in our sample. The number of bonds that trade
approximately every day (defined as over 200 days in the year) varies between
0 and 6; this is out of a sample of roughly 24,000 bonds. Even considering a
level of trading of at least once a year as relatively liquid, the percentage of
the total number of bonds in our sample that would be defined as liquid is
between 25% and 30%, each year. The vast majority of the bonds - over 70%
- do not even trade once a year. These statistics throw some light on the
problem of illiquidity in the corporate bond market and suggest that it would
be futile to look for liquidity measures based only on market micro-structure
data.
We now go into greater detail regarding the characteristics of the corpo-
rate bonds that are traded, based on our data set, over the period 1999-2004.
We give an indication in Table 4 about the trading characteristics of corpo-
rate bonds that trade in the marketplace. In general, we see that bond issues
are split into one of eight broad industry categories that we define (these are
in line with the categories used by Reuters). The percentages in the various
industry categories were fairly stable over the course of the 1999-2004 period.
The financial services industry (the banks and the other financial categories)
is the biggest issuer of corporate debt - in 2004, more than one-third of all
new debt issues came from firms within this industry. This is not surprising,
as most financial services firms such as banks and insurance companies are
highly leveraged entities, with substantial debt obligations on the right-hand
sides of their balance sheets.
Table 5 shows how the credit rating of bonds in the database has been
changing through time. During the late 1990s, the database contained a
higher percentage of investment grade bonds. For example, in 1999, 54% of
bond issues were rated as investment grade. As we progress through time,
however, this proportion increased to 67% in 2004. At the same time, the
proportion of speculative grade bonds increased from 16% in 1999 to 30% in
2004. There are two trends at work here. First, significant changes occurred
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in the marketplace, during this period. Equity markets dropped substantially
during the early 2000s, indicating that the probability of default of most
firms increased, as well. This conclusion is supported by the fact that credit
spreads also increased significantly during this time period. Therefore, if
rating agencies were doing a reasonable job, the conclusion that more bonds
in the marketplace were getting rated below investment grade, is natural.
Second, part of the changing picture is due to the fact that the proportion of
bonds that were unrated declined over time, since rating agencies increased
their coverage of corporate bonds. Although, many of these newly rated
bonds fell into the speculative category, others were rated investment grade.
Hence, the proportion of both investment and speculative grade bonds rose,
while the proportion in the unrated category declined during this period.
We next present the data analyzed in terms of various bond characteristics
such as maturity, time since issuance, face value and frequency of trading.
We do this for each year, for data below each cumulative decile, during
our sample period, 1999-2004. Table 6 displays the maturity structure of
corporate debt in the marketplace. It is interesting to note that the average
maturity of debt has been steadily decreasing through time. For example,
the median bond in our data set has gone from an average 6.4 year maturity
in 1999 to a 5.0 year maturity in 2004. Similarly, the maturity of the top
decile dropped from 24.4 years in 1999 to 23.4 years in 2004, while that of
the bottom decile remained unchanged between 1999 and 2004, at 1.1 years.
Table 7 shows that the time since issuance of outstanding debt has been
steadily increasing from 1999 until the present. If we think of a time line
for currently outstanding debt, there are two interesting points in time to
consider: the first is when it was issued, relative to today, and the second
is when it matures relative to today. From Table 6, we know that the
time-to-maturity of the typical bond has decreased through time. However,
from Table 7, we see that the time since the debt was issued has increased
considerably through time. For the median security, it has gone from 1.7
years since issuance in 1999, to 4.3 years since issuance, in 2004. Similarly,
for the top decile, it has gone from 6.8 years in 1999, to 8.9 years in 2004,
while for the bottom decile increased from “when-issued” in 1999 to 1.2 years.
The explanation that reconciles these two facts is that the quantum of
new debt issues has decreased through time, and firms have been financing
themselves with shorter term debt than in the past. The decreasing number
of debt issues means that the average debt issue in the marketplace is not
getting replaced (refinanced); thus the time since issuance of the average
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debt issue is increasing. Furthermore, the debt that is getting refinanced is
being replaced with instruments with shorter maturity, causing the average
maturity of bonds outstanding to decrease. This is a surprising result given
that interest rates during this time period were coming down, which would
lead us to expect substantial new debt issuance and, therefore, causing the
time since issuance statistic to decrease through time. Part of the explanation
is the deleveraging of corporate balance sheets, that occurred following the
stock market decline in 2000-2001. However, there is another factor at work
here that explains part of this somewhat surprising result. We present this
in the next table.
Table 8 shows the distribution of the outstanding face amount of all debt
issues in the market. The table shows that the average face value amount
has increased substantially over the last ten years. For the median bond,
the face amount outstanding increased from $ 150 million in 1999 to $ 272
million in 2004. For the top decile, the corresponding numbers were $ 350
million in 1999 going up to $ 950 million in 2004; for the bottom decile, the
face amount outstanding went up from $ 25 million in 1999 to $ 100 million
in 2004. In reconciling this result with the results of the previous table, we
see that while the number of new bond issues has been decreasing (as Table
7 shows), the face value of the average issuance must have been increasing
substantially. This would account for the increased size of the average face
value of debt remaining in the markets, over time.11 Thus, we seem to be
observing the following financing trend: firms have been issuer fewer new
bonds over time, but each new issuance has been larger than in the past, and
of shorter maturity.
Table 9 gives us a sense of the amount of trading activity that occurs
in the US corporate bond markets. Table 9, which is a variation of Table
3, shows the average number of days that passes between trades for a bond
issue, for those bonds that are actually traded. As shown in Table 3, most
bonds did not have any trades for many years. We exclude them from the
analysis presented in Table 9. For the median traded bond, the average
time between trades declined from 103 days in 1999 to 58 days in 2004.12
11An alternative explanation is that the debt maturing through time had unusually
small face value, thus causing the average face value of the remaining debt to increase.
However, if this were the case, the total amount of debt outstanding would not increase,
which indeed occurred. Furthermore, we would not expect to see increased daily trading
volume (in dollars) through time, which we also observe.
12There are roughly twenty two trading days in a calendar month.
12
For the bonds in the top decile, the time between trades remained virtually
unchanged around 252 days.Even for the most liquid bonds in the bottom
decile, liquidity improved during this period, with the time between trades
dropping from 23 days in 1999 to 12 days in 2004. Despite the general
improvement in liquidity in the corporate bond market, attested to by these
statistics, the liquidity in this market, measured by the time between trades is
much worse than in the stock market. For the median stock, in comparison,
this value is more of the order of minutes. For the most liquid stocks, this
statistic could even be of the order of seconds. Therefore, what we see from
Table 9 is that the corporate bond market is orders of magnitude more illiquid
than the stock market. An interesting point to emphasize is that despite the
degree of illiquidity that currently exists in the corporate bond market, the
current state of liquidity is much better than in prior years. Furthermore,
this increase in trading is seen throughout the market, except in the most
illiquid bonds. Thus, for most of the time period under investigation, even
the median corporate bond (of all the bonds that traded at all during the
year) has traded less than once every three months, which suggests that
illiquidity is a central issue in this market.
2.4 Liquidity Measurement
The previous section provided strong evidence in support of the conclusion
that the U.S. corporate bond market is extremely illiquid, although the de-
gree of liquidity seems to be improving over the course of the five year period
between 1999 and 2004. Therefore, in many ways, this seems a much more
relevant setting to study the problems of illiquidity and its consequences,
compared to equity markets, since this is a significant issue in the corporate
debt market. However, one important problem remains. Most corporate
bonds rarely trade. This makes it difficult to distinguish between whether
a given bond is more liquid than another, particularly if both bonds do not
trade for several days or even months. For example, if one bond trades six
times a year and a second one trades three times a year, the amount of trad-
ing in both cases is too small to conclude that the first bond is twice as
liquid as the second. A much more statistically reliable measure is needed
beyond mere trade volume, or time between trades, to measure the liquidity
of corporate bonds. To this end, we define a statistic called “latent liquidity”
to measure the liquidity of any security that trades in a dealer market.
In a dealer, or OTC, market what really determines the liquidity of a
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security is the ease with which a dealer can access a security. For example,
if a buy order comes in to a dealer, she could supply that order out of his
own inventory, or she could try to source the bonds from the inventory of
one of his other customers. In other words, the dealer could “work the
order” by contacting customers to see if she can convince someone to sell
him the bonds to fill the buy order.13 Consider the case when she is trying
to call customers to fill the buy order. If the bond issue of interest is held
primarily by funds with high turnover, it should be easier for the dealer to
call one of these investors and convince the investor to sell him the needed
bonds than if the bonds were held primarily by funds with low turnover
(insurance companies, for example).14 This is because the high turnover
funds are used to trading in and out of securities with high frequency, at
least, relative to many fixed income investors, who tend to be “buy and hold
till maturity” type of investors. Thus, they could be more easily convinced
to trade a particular security they are holding. Therefore, whether a bond
issue experiences a great deal of trading volume or not, we can say that a
bond issue is more liquid in our sense, if it is more accessible by dealers. We
define such access in terms of the turnover of the investors holding the bond
issue.
This measure of accessibility of a security is not a direct measure of liq-
uidity, but rather a more latent measure. In order to measure latent liquidity,
we need to be able to determine, for each bond issue, which of the many types
of investor holds the issue and the aggregated weighted average turnover of
all the funds holding the issue. If the weighted average turnover of all the
funds holding a particular bond issue is high, then we say that the bond
issue has high latent liquidity. In other words, it is more accessible, relative
to another bond that has lower latent liquidity. A bond’s accessibility can
be thought as the degree to which it is held by investors who are expected
to trade more frequently, based on historical trading patterns.
Once again, a custodian is in an ideal position to obtain the information
needed to calculate latent liquidity. Custodians are aware not only about
the transactions level information but also the individual portfolio holdings.
Therefore, if we look at the historical custodial holdings database, we can cal-
13The dealer will, of course, try to buy the bonds at a lower price from the customer
than the price at which she will fill the buy order. Thus, she earns a fee for his “search
services.”
14Of course, one can define a whole continuum of customers, in terms of their propensity
to trade, rather than the two referred to in the example.
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culate a twelve-month historical turnover number for all portfolios. For any
particular bond issue, we aggregate across all the investors holding that issue,
to calculate a weighted average turnover measure. This statistic becomes our
latent liquidity measure for that particular bond.
More formally, we define the fractional holding of bond i (as a percentage
of the total outstanding amount of the bond issue in our database) by fund j
at the end of month t as piij,t. Also, we define the average portfolio turnover
of fund j from month t to month t−12 as Tj,t, where the portfolio turnover is
defined as the ratio of the value of fund j at the end of month t to the dollar
trading volume of fund j from month t to month t− 12. Latent liquidity for
bond i in month t is defined as
Lit =
∑
j
piij,tTj,t
Therefore, we define latent liquidity for any bond i, at any time t, as the
aggregate weighted-average level of turnover of the individual funds holding
bond i.
The most convenient feature of this measure is that it is based entirely
on aggregate investors’ holdings and does not require individual transaction
details. In fact, as we have already said, the lack of sufficient corporate bond
transaction data is at the heart of illiquidity in bond markets. Therefore,
no trading in a particular bond needs to be observed in order to calculate
this measure, which is especially convenient in the case of illiquid markets.
Furthermore, this measure can be calculated quite accurately, on a monthly
basis, for every public bond issue, given the unique nature of our database,
which consists of data on both transactions, as well as holdings of a large
set of investors in the market. It should be noted that even if a larger
set of trading data eventually became available from the TRACE database,
the metric we propose would require, in addition, information regarding the
holdings of individual investors in the market, which is usually proprietary.
It is unlikely, therefore, that our metric can be refined and extended further,
using all the information available in the market.
Figures 1 through 5 present the patterns of changes in latent liquidity
with respect to changes in certain bond characteristics, to show how they
accord with more casually stated stylized facts. To generate these figures,
after calculating a latent liquidity number for each US corporate bond in our
database, we classified bonds into one of 5 groups segregated by quintiles,
based on their latent liquidity, with bonds up to quintile 1 representing bonds
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with the highest latent liquidity and those just above quintile 5 representing
bonds with the lowest latent liquidity. For each bond characteristic, the latent
liquidity is averaged across bonds with a particular value of the characteristic.
The graphs represent the relationship between the (average) latent liquidity
and the particular bond characteristic.
Figure 1 plots the (average) latent liquidity of bonds in relation to their
age, from the time they were first issued, until maturity. We observe that
bonds are at their peak latent liquidity levels when they are just issued. Their
latent liquidity level decreases steadily after issuance, until final maturity.
This is consistent with, but more specific than, the casual evidence that “on-
the-run” bonds are more liquid than their “off-the-run” counterparts. The
conjecture that emerges is that many bonds are initially placed into high
turnover funds, who then “flip” the bonds to lower turnover (usually, buy-
and-hold) funds. We see that latent liquidity values are greater than 2.5, on
average, for bonds with an age of less than one year, and, in general, decrease
over time to a value of less than 4, for bonds with an age greater than 26
years.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between (average) latent liquidity and
issue size. Generally speaking, there is a positive correlation between issue
size and liquidity. The biggest improvement in liquidity occurs for issue
sizes below $ 600 million. The liquidity is relatively flat again, until a size
of $3 billion is reached, when it increases once again. Figure 3 provides a
plot of the (average) latent liquidity versus time to maturity for bond issues.
We observe that the longer the maturity of the bond, the higher the latent
liquidity, although there are clear jumps in the pattern, at certain maturity
levels. The jumps in this figure are initially surprising, but easily explained
- they are due to bond issues of “standard” maturities. For instance, bonds
with a 10-year maturity are of two types: bonds that were issued in the past
and are now down to 10 years to maturity i.e., “off-the-run” bonds and bonds
that have just been issued i.e., “on-the-run” bonds. However, bonds with a
11-year maturity are likely composed of only “off-the-run” bonds (because 11
years is seldom chosen as a maturity time for newly-issued bonds). Therefore,
the significantly higher latent liquidity of the “on-the-run” bonds at the 10-
year maturity level results in a substantially higher latent liquidity measure
at the 10-year level vs. the 11-year level; hence, the observed jump in the
graph. The same result holds at typical maturity points for new issues, such
as at 5, 7, and 20 years, with the most pronounced jump occurring at the
10-year level, which is the most popular maturity for corporate bond issues.
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Figure 4 presents the (average) latent liquidity as a function of coupon
rates over the sample period. There is no clear pattern in this relationship,
because coupon effects are confounded by credit rating, age, maturity and
issue date, since there are strong correlations between the coupon rate and
these bond characteristics. In a loose sense, it appears that issues with a
higher coupon rate enjoy greater liquidity than those with a lower coupon.
However, there is a cyclical pattern to this relationship. At one extreme, it
appears that zero coupon bonds are more liquid than bonds with a promised
coupon rate of up to approximately 10 %. This may be due to the desirability
of zero coupon issues for implementing hedging and cash matching strategies.
At the other extreme, it appears that issues with very high coupon rates are
more liquid than issues with lower coupon rates. In the relatively low interest
rate environment that prevailed in 1999-2004, this translates into a statement
that high premium bonds are more liquid than discount or par bonds. In
between the relationship exhibits a cyclical pattern.
Figure 5 represents the (average) latent liquidity as a function of Moody’s
credit rating. We observe that latent liquidity is the lowest for A-rated
bonds, and the highest for speculative grade bonds. This can be explained
by the fact that insurance companies (which have low portfolio turnover)
are typically overweighted in A-rated bonds. On the other hand, speculative
grade bonds are concentrated among high turnover funds. These figures
convey an intuitive sense of the relationship between latent liquidity and bond
characteristics. However, since the relationship is inherently multi-factor in
nature, with independet variables that are to some extent, correlated with
each other, we need to examine it further through regression analysis. We
turn to this empirical analysis next.
3 Empirical Results
In this section, we use our measure of latent liquidity to try to discern what
features of a bond lead to better liquidity. To investigate this question, we
conduct a series of regressions where the dependent variable is a metric of
liquidity for a bond in the database at a point in time, while the independent
variables are a set of the bond’s characteristics. We conduct these regressions
in three stages. In the first stage, we restrict ourselves to only those bonds
where we see at least one trade per year (less than half the database, over
time). Then, in the second stage, we use the entire universe of bonds. In
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the third and last stage, we conduct our analysis on the illiquid segment (the
complement of the dataset used in the first stage) of our database, defined
as bonds that had less than one trade a year.
In order to test/demonstrate the robustness of our liquidity measure,
we will also compare the empirical results we obtain using latent liquid-
ity against those obtained using more conventional trade-based measures of
liquidity. The trade-based measures of liquidity require information about
actual trades; therefore, for these measures, we are forced to restrict our-
selves to the set of bonds for which we observe at least one trade per year.
From our earlier tables, this means that we restrict ourselves to slightly less
than half the database. We use three sets of trade-based liquidity measures
for a bond. The first is trade days: the number of days per year that we see
a particular bond trade. The second is trade count: the number of trades
that we observe in our database for that particular bond per year. Finally,
the third measure that we use is trade volume: the average market value of
trades that we observe for the bond each year. For all of the trade-based
liquidity measures that we use, we normalize the measures for each bond
issue by dividing by the amount of that issue outstanding. This effectively
allows us to control for issue size. Finally, for all the liquidity measures we
consider (including latent liquidity), we convert the liquidity measures into
a percentile rank within each year, since we interpret these measures to be
ordinal, rather than cardinal, in nature.
We first examine the correlations between our measure of latent liquidity
and the three trade-based measures of liquidity. Of course, this analysis can
be undertaken only for the relatively liquid part of our database, the results
of which are presented in Table 10. Only bonds that traded at least once
in a given year were included in the sample. The correlations between the
three trade-based measures are fairly high, as is to be expected, since they all
measure the frequency and size of trades. However, the correlations between
latent liquidity and the trade-based measures are more modest. Given the
relatively infrequent trading in even the most liquid US corporate bonds,
apparently the trade-based measures do not quite measure the same latent
liquidity effects that are captured in our measure. We next investigate the
relationship between the four measures and various characteristics of the
bonds, in separate regressions, the results of which are presented in Tables
11 through 14.
Table 11 presents results from the first of these regressions of these liquid-
ity measures, on independent variables related to the characteristics of the
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bonds, in the relatively liquid (i.e., traded) segment of our database. These
regressions were performed on a yearly basis for data from 1999 to 2004, as
well as for the pooled sample for the whole period. Given the structural
changes that occurred during the dot-com boom and subsequent collapse,
we believe that the year-by-year results may be revealing. In this regression,
we use latent liquidity (in percentile rank) as the dependent variable. In
the tables that follow (Tables 12 to 14), we present the results from similar
regressions for the other measures of liquidity. Latent liquidity values are as
identified as of first trade date of year. These values are arranged in increas-
ing order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher
liquidity percentile value indicates higher liquidity. All columns, but the last,
present the coefficients and standard errors of a year-by-year regression. The
last column presents the coefficients and standard errors for the data from
1999 to 2004 in a pooled regression.15
From the results of Table 11, we see that if a bond’s issuer is classified
as being either an industrial or a utility company, the bond tends to be less
liquid, i.e., it tends to be held by low turnover funds. On the other hand,
if a bond is from a financial issuer, there does not appear to be any effect
on the liquidity of the bond. The credit quality of a bond appears to be
inversely correlated to liquidity, i.e. the higher the probability of default
(and therefore the lower the credit rating) the higher the degree of liquidity.
This is a surprising result, because most people tend to associate high credit
quality with high liquidity. The simple explanation here is that bonds that
have a high credit quality are usually held by long-term “buy-and-hold”
investors such as insurance companies, which have long-term liabilities and
hold fixed income assets for asset-liability matching reasons, because these
bonds are less likely to default and force a portfolio rebalancing. In addition,
low-grade issues have a greater probability of rating migration, necessiating
more frequent rebalancing.
As one might expect, the current age of the bond since issuance has
a strong negative correlation with liquidity, i.e., a bond with a longer age
(one that has been outstanding for a longer time) has less liquidity. This is
15The panel regressions have to be adjusted for the persistence of the independent
variables. However, including the lagged values of the variables is problematic, in our
case, since we have only five years of data. However, it should be noted that the standard
errors reported in this and succeeding tables, are all biased downwards, and hence the
corresponding t-statistics have to be interpreted with caution. We, therefore, introduce
year dummies, which partly control for the persistence effects, albeit imperfectly
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the well known “on-the-run” vs. “off-the-run” effect (see for instance Sarig
and Warga (1989), Warga (1992), Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999), Hong and
Warga (2000), Schultz (2001), and Hotchkiss, Warga, and Jostava (2002)).
When a bond is initially issued, it is “on-the-run” and has much higher
liquidity than some time later, after it has been outstanding for a while and
becomes “off-the-run”.
The “original maturity” variables are all dummy variables indicating the
maturity of the bond when it was issued. From the coefficients here, it
appears that bonds with lower original maturity such as 5 and 7 years, are
more liquid that those with an original maturity of 10 years. In turn, bonds
that were originally of 10-year maturity tend to be more liquid than their
30-year counterparts. Again, one explanation here is that long term “buy-
and-hold” investors such as insurance companies (which hold a substantial
amount of the total bonds outstanding) have long-dated liabilities, against
which they match long-dated assets. Once they “find” these assets, they
tend to hold them rather than trade them frequently.
Liquidity seems to be strongly correlated with the face amount of a bond
outstanding, or the issue size of a bond. The larger the issue size, the more
liquid is the bond. A preview of this result was illustrated in Figure 2, where
we saw that when the size of the issue falls below $1 billion, the smaller an
issue size, the less liquid is the issuance. However, Figure 2 also showed that
for amounts above $1 billion, issue size seems to have only a small effect
on liquidity. For smaller issue sizes, liquidity clearly diminishes with size.
Smaller-sized issues do not appeal to a broad class of investors, since it would
be difficult and costly to acquire a large position, which some institutional
investors may require. The link between issue size and liquidity has also been
identified by other researchers such as Hong and Warga (2000), Alexander,
Edwards, and Ferri (2000), and Hotchkiss, Warga, and Jostava (2002).
Issuers generally have the choice of including various provisions into bond
indentures. These provisions include option features that render the bond
callable or puttable, making the bond convertible into equity, or providing for
a sinking fund provision, in addition to various covenants. In our results, all
these option features lead to an increase in a bond’s liquidity. These results
are surprising: one might think that adding complexity such as optionality
to a bond would make it more difficult to trade, since the complexity may
prevent less sophisticated investors from investing in these bonds, thus limit-
ing the pool of potential investors. One should remember, however, that in a
regime of volatile markets for equity and debt, such as the 1999-2004 period
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of our study, the option features of a bond require more frequent hedging,
thereby increasing its turnover.
Other characteristics of a bond such as a sinking fund provision, whether
the bond pays a fixed or floating coupon payment, or the periodicity of the
coupon payments, do not seem to affect the liquidity of a bond in a systematic
manner. However, if a bond has a zero coupon, this feature seems to increase
its liquidity. As discussed previously, this may be due to the desirability of
zero coupon issues for implementing hedging and cash matching strategies.
The last column of Table 11 provides the regression results for for the
period 1999-2004, pooled across the years. It is interesting to note that the
pooled regression simply sharpens the results from the year-by-year regres-
sions. With more data, the standard errors of the coefficients decrease and
the variables that were found to be statistically significant before, become
even more so. The results remain completely consistent with the conclusions
drawn from the year-by-year regressions.
Tables 12 to 14 present the same regressions as in Table 11, but with the
latent liquidity dependent variable being replaced by the trade-based mea-
sures of liquidity: trade days, trade count, and trade market value. Exactly
the same bonds, i.e. those that were part of the traded set, were used in all of
the regressions in Tables 12 to 14, as in Table 11. The results in these tables,
for the most part, are consistent with the findings in Table 11. However,
the effects on liquidity seem to be sharper (more statistically significant)
in the latent liquidity-based regressions. For example, the maturity effect
disappears in all the trade-based liquidity regressions. The coefficients on
the 5-year, 7-year, and 30-year dummy variables are all insignificant in the
trade-based liquidity measures, though they come in strongly significant in
the latent liquidity regression.
Intuitively, for the reasons given earlier, we expect the maturity effect
to be an important determinant of liquidity. Also, in the case of latent liq-
uidity based regression, liquidity seems to be strongly correlated with the
face amount of a bond outstanding. This makes intuitive sense as discussed
above. However, the relationship between amount outstanding and liquidity
seems to be inconsistent across the other measures. It is weak to negative
for trade days based regression, flips between positive and negative for trade
count based regression and shows up as positively correlated for trade mar-
ket value based regression. The results are also conflicting with respect to
convertible features of bonds. As noted above, the frequent hedging, par-
ticularly by hedge funds, during uncertain market environment, can lead to
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more turnover for convertible bonds. The latent liquidity regression results
are consistent with this hypothesis and shows a positive relationship between
convertibility of a bond and its liquidity. However, the other measures show
a negative relationship. One reason for the above anamolies in trade based
regression results (Tables 12 through 14) might be that corporate bonds are
extremely illiquid and trade very infrequently. Therefore, there is less statis-
tical power in tests using trade-based measures, since many of the bonds do
not trade very much.
Table 15 presents the same regression as in Table 11, but conducted on the
entire State Street database of bonds, including bonds that did not trade at
all in a given year. We cannot conduct this regression using the trade-based
measures of liquidity, because more than half the bonds in the universe do
not trade in any given year. However, because our latent liquidity measure
does not require transaction data, this lack of trading poses no problems for
conducting these regressions. The results in Table 15 are completely consis-
tent with the results in Table 11, with the statistical significance increasing
due to the use of substantially more data. As in the previous tables, the last
column presents the results of regressions conducted on the pooled set of data
from 1999-2004. We first observe that the results are completely consistent
with the results from the year-by-year regressions. The credit quality of a
bond is inversely correlated with liquidity in the overall sample, consistent
with the results reported in Table 11. Similarly, the results are also consis-
tent between Tables 11 and 15, with regard to bond age, original maturity,
amount outstanding, optionality, the floating dummytime to maturity and
the coupon rate. The suggests, that latent liquidity is a reasonable metric of
liquidity even in the relatively illiquid part of the US corporate bond market,
where trade-based measures of liquidity cannot be obtained.
In Table 16, we show the results of the pooled regression on the illiquid
segment of the corporate bond universe. This set comprises of bonds for
which we do not observe even one trade during a calendar year.16 Of course,
this limits us to using a latent liquidity measure only. We compare the results
to the pooled regression results (in the last column) of Table 10 which is
based on the relatively liquid set, i.e. the set of bonds which had at least
one trade during a calendar year. Between the two data sets, the directional
16This is essentially the complement of the restricted database, where we only considered
bonds that had traded at least once during the calendar year. The results in Table 16 are
from the other part of the dataset, and should, therefore, be compared with the first set
of regressions presented in Table 11.
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relationships between latent liquidity and bond characteristic are completely
consistent. (The minor exceptions being that in the case of illiquid set,
the financial sector, sinkable and floating bond dummy flags, load up with
statistical significance). This gives us a strong indication that latent liquidity
measure can be extended to the illiquid segment of the US corporate bond
market. The fact that latent liquidity is a consistent measure and does not
have a sample bias, makes us believe that it can be used as a measure of
liquidity uniformly across all the bonds in US corporate bond universe. It
can be applied not only to the relatively liquid bonds where trade data is
available but also to the illiquid segment of US corporate bond universe,
where traditional trading data based measures cannot be obtained.
4 Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper presents a new measure of liquidity called latent
liquidity, and we apply this measure to a unique corporate bond database to
discern the characteristics of bonds that lead to higher liquidity. Unlike con-
ventional measures of liquidity, such as trading volume and bid-ask spreads,
latent liquidity does not use transaction information. Instead, it uses in-
formation about the ownership of securities to discern the accessibility of a
security by a securities dealer. Therefore, latent liquidity has the important
advantage in being able to provide a measure of liquidity in situations of low
trading intensity, when transaction data are insufficient to compute tradi-
tional microstructure-based measures of liquidity but where liquidity is an
important issue.
We apply the latent liquidity measure to a corporate bond database (cor-
porate bonds are an extremely illiquid asset class) in order to determine the
characteristics of corporate bonds that lead to higher or lower liquidity. We
find that credit quality, the age of a bond, the size of a bond issue, the orig-
inal maturity value of a bond at issuance date, and provisions such as a call,
put, or convertible options all have strong impact on liquidity. If illiquidity
is priced (i.e., investors charge a liquidity risk premium), then the results of
this paper indicate that the design of a bond can have a strong influence on
the cost of the bond to the issuer, and the choice of which bond to hold (from
the same issuer) can have a strong influence on the returns of an investor.
The directional relationship between liquidity and the bond characteris-
tics is compared across the various liquidity mesaures. For the most part, the
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results for latent liquidity agree with the three traditional measures based on
transaction data. However, in certain cases such as original maturity of the
bond, the face value outstanding and the optionality features of the bonds,
latent liquidity seems to agree with intuitive reasoning, whereas the other
measures do not always do so. We also determine that latent liquidity does
not have a sample bias and can be used as a measure of liquidity uniformly
across all the bonds in Corporate bond universe. It can be applied not only
to the relatively liquid bonds where trade data is available but also to the
illiquid segment of Corporate Bond universe, where transactional data is rare
or unavailable and where traditional measures (based on transactional data)
can not be applied with any statistical confidence.
We believe that this research can also pave the way to explain some
portion of the yield spreads on corporate bonds that cannot be explained
by structural models of corporate credit risk. In future research, we will
investigate this directly by incorporating our liquidity factors in structural
models of credit risk. It would also be interesting to examine the significance
of liquidity in determining asset returns. In particular, we propose to use
this measure in explaining the cross-sectional variation in bond yield spreads,
over their Treasury and swap rate benchmarks, after accounting for default
risk. Based on the evidence presented in this paper, it is likely that latent
liquidity will explain at least part of the cross-sectional variation in bond
yields, apart from the default premium. Our research will also address the
issue of liquidity risk of corporate bonds, and whether or not, it is systematic
in relation to the common liquidity. An additional question that we will
attempt to examine is whether liquidity risk is, in fact, priced, and whether
it is an important element of the total yield spread of corporate bonds over
comparable Treasury bonds.
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Total State Street Total State Street State Street
Outstanding Holdings Outstanding Holdings Holdings
Industry
As % Of 
Total
As % Of 
Total
As % Of 
Total Outstanding
Banks 545$             100$          12.16 15.49 18.41
Consumer Goods 145$             21$           3.23 3.20 14.32
Electric Power 319$             40$           7.10 6.10 12.42
Energy Company 216$             32$           4.82 4.87 14.61
Gas Distribution 22$               3$             0.48 0.48 14.47
Independent Finance 26$               3$             0.58 0.41 10.17
Manufacturing 624$             82$           13.91 12.68 13.17
Other Financial 1,529$           221$          34.08 34.06 14.44
Service Company 662$             92$           14.77 14.14 13.83
Telephone 302$             42$           6.74 6.46 13.85
Transportation 95$               14$           2.13 2.11 14.33
Total 4,485$           648$          100 100 14.45
Table 1A: Composition of bonds outstanding in the State Street custody database, by Industry
This table presents the composition, by industry category, as defined by Reuters, of US corporate bonds outstanding, as
estimated by them, as of December 2004. This aggregate amount accounts for about 95% of the total US corporate bonds
outstanding of $4,4704.5 billion, based on the data of the Bond Market Association (BMA) at
http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=323. The first column defines the eleven industry categories, and the second
and third columns define the amounts in billions of US dollars, of the total holdings in the markets for the universe of all
issues, and for those issues where State Street Corporation served as custodian. The third and fourth columns show the
relative amounts in percent for the eleven industry categories in the Reuters and State Street databases, respectively. The
last column indicates the relative amount held by State Street, as a fraction of total US dollar amounts outstanding, in each
industry category.  
Total State Street Total State Street State Street
Outstanding Holdings Outstanding Holdings Holdings
Credit Rating
As % Of 
Total
As % Of 
Total
As % Of 
Total Outstanding
Aaa 257$                49$           5.72 7.55 19.08
Aa 726$                129$          16.19 19.92 17.78
A 1,071$           148$          23.88 22.83 13.82
Baa 1,071$           152$          23.88 23.51 14.23
Ba 325$             48$           7.25 7.37 14.69
B 430$             71$           9.58 10.94 16.51
Caa 173$             24$           3.86 3.70 13.86
C 139$             8$             3.10 1.29 6.03
Other or NA Grade 294$             19$           6.55 2.88 6.35
Total 4,485$           648$          100 100 14.45
Table 1B: Composition of bonds outstanding in the State Street custody database, by credit rating
This table presents the composition, by credit rating, as defined by Moody’s, of US corporate bonds outstanding, as estimated
by Reuters, as of December 2004. This aggregate amount accounts for about 95% of the total US corporate bonds outstanding
of $4,4704.5 billion, based on the data of the Bond Market Association (BMA) at
http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=323. The first column defines the nine credit rating categories, and the second and
third columns define the amounts in billions of US dollars, of the total holdings in the markets for the universe of all issues,
and for those issues where State Street Corporation served as custodian. The third and fourth columns show the relative
amounts in percent for the nine credit rating categories in the Reuters and State Street databases, respectively. The last
column indicates the relative amount held by State Street, as a fraction of total US dollar amounts outstanding, in each credit
rating category.
Total State Street Total State Street State Street
Outstanding Holdings Outstanding Holdings Holdings
Time To Maturity
As % Of 
Total
As % Of 
Total
As % Of 
Total Outstanding
<= 1 Year 693$              122$          15.46 18.89 17.65
2 Years 436$              67$           9.72 10.40 15.47
3 Years 391$              49$           8.72 7.49 12.41
4 Years 337$              44$           7.50 6.82 13.13
5 Years 296$              40$           6.61 6.15 13.45
6 Years 324$              49$           7.22 7.53 15.06
7 Years 288$              49$           6.43 7.56 17.01
8 Years 236$              42$           5.25 6.44 17.73
9 Years 222$              42$           4.96 6.45 18.80
10 Years 154$              27$           3.43 4.10 17.31
Between 11 and 15 Years 245$              24$           5.46 3.66 9.71
Between 16 and 30 Years 807$              89$           17.99 13.81 11.09
> 30 Years 56$                4$             1.24 0.69 8.01
Total 4,485$            648$          100 100 14.45
Table 1C: Composition of bonds outstanding in the State Street custody database, by maturity
This table presents the composition, by maturity, of US corporate bonds outstanding, as estimated by Reuters, as of December 2004.
This aggregate amount accounts for about 95% of the total US corporate bonds outstanding of $4,4704.5 billion, based on the data of the
Bond Market Association (BMA) at http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=323. The first column defines the thirteen maturity
categories, and the second and third columns define the amounts, in billions of dollars of the total holdings in the markets, for the
universe of all issues, and for those issues where State Street Corporation served as custodian. The third and fourth columns show the
relative amounts in percent for the thirteen maturity categories in the Reuters and State Street databases, respectively. The last column
indicates the relative amount held by State Street, as a fraction of total US dollar amounts outstanding, in each maturity category.       
Trade
Year
Trade 
Month
Average Daily Trade Volume 
in State Street Custody Holdings
(in billions of US Dollars)
Average Daily Trade Volume in 
Market
(in billions of US Dollars)
Average Daily Trade Volume in 
State Street Custody Holdings
(as a % of Market)
2003 January 2.21 22.9 9.65%
2003 February 2.06 21.8 9.46%
2003 March 2.15 23.4 9.19%
2003 April 2.09 20.5 10.19%
2003 May 2.12 23 9.20%
2003 June 1.83 22 8.31%
2003 July 1.88 20.3 9.25%
2003 August 1.57 15.4 10.21%
2003 September 2.00 23.8 8.40%
2003 October 1.90 20.2 9.41%
2003 November 1.89 20 9.45%
2003 December 1.60 16 10.02%
2004 January 2.16 25 8.65%
2004 February 2.02 22 9.17%
2004 March 2.20 22.7 9.70%
2004 April 1.84 19.8 9.31%
2004 May 1.83 18.4 9.96%
2004 June 1.67 20.1 8.33%
2004 July 1.91 20.6 9.29%
2004 August 1.58 20.6 7.67%
2004 September 1.99 21.1 9.43%
2004 October 1.89 22.3 8.48%
2004 November 1.85 22.7 8.15%
2004 December 1.56 19.4 8.07%
Table 2: Comparision of trade volume between State Street Custody compared to the whole market
This table presents statistics for the monthly traded volume (in billions of US dollars) of US Corporate bonds for the entire market versus
the amount traded in the State Street Corporation’s custody holdings database, during the period January 2003 to December 2004. Only
securities greater than one year to maturity are considered. The aggregate market statistics is provided by Bond Market Association
(BMA) at http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=96. The first two columns indicate the date. The third and fourth columns indicate
the average daily par quantity traded in the State Street database, and in the market, respectively. The last column indicates the ratio of
the amount traded from State Street holdings to that for the entire market (expressed as a percentage). 
Frequency of Trading 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
> 200 days in year 0 0 2 5 6 3
> 150 days in year 1 6 6 21 37 23
> 100 days in year 7 21 33 114 126 115
> 50 days in year 84 169 220 404 566 596
> 30 days in year 205 303 368 480 609 732
> 10 days in year 1184 1347 1346 1462 1512 1842
> 5 days in year 1185 1160 1186 1068 1056 1222
At least 1 day in year 3473 3332 2910 2610 2515 2673
No trades in year 18502 17307 16096 15382 15467 16988
Total Issues 24641 23645 22167 21546 21894 24194
Table 3: Trade distribution by the frequency of trading
This table presents statistics for the distribution of issues by frequency of trade, of US Corporate dollar
denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation’s custody trades database, during the period 1999-2004.
The frequency of trading of an issue is defined as number of distinct trading days in a given year. The data
shows the number of issues corresponding to a particular trading frequency in each year. For example, in
2003, 6 issues traded more than 200 days and 37 issues traded between 150 and 200 days.
Industry Sector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Banks 12 12 12 11 11 11
Consumer Goods 4 3 3 4 4 4
Electric Power 7 7 7 7 8 8
Energy Company 5 6 6 6 6 6
Gas Distribution 1 1 1 1 1 1
Independent Finance 1 1 1 1 1 0
Manufacturing 16 15 14 15 17 17
Other Financial 30 30 30 28 28 28
Service Company 16 15 15 17 17 18
Telephone 7 7 7 6 5 5
Transportation 3 3 3 3 3 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 4:  Trade distribution by industry sector
This table presents the distribution of trade market value, by industry sector, as defined by Reuters, of
US Corporate dollar denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation’s custody trades database,
during the period 1999-2004. The trading distribution of a given industry sector is expressed as a
percentage of total market value of trades, for the given year, within the State Street custody database.
Credit Rating 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Aaa 2 3 3 4 4 4
Aa 10 10 11 11 11 11
A 26 29 27 25 25 27
Baa 16 18 18 20 22 25
Below Baa 16 18 17 21 26 30
Other or NA Grade 30 22 24 19 12 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 5:  Trading distribution by credit rating
This table presents the distribution of trade market value, by credit rating, as defined by Moody’s
of US corporate dollar denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation’s custody trades
database, during the period 1999-2004. The trading distribution of a given credit rating is expressed
as percentage of total market value of trades, for the given year, within the State Street’s custody
trades database. 
Percentile 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
10 1.1 1 1 1 1 1.1
20 2.1 1.7 1.8 2 2.1 2
30 3.4 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.1
40 4.9 4 4.2 4.5 4.4 4
50 6.4 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.3 5
60 8 7 6.9 6.9 6.7 6.5
70 9.3 8.3 8.2 8.7 8.8 8.1
80 10.1 10 10 10 12.1 12.2
90 24.4 23.5 23.6 24 23.9 23.4
Table 6: Percentile distribution of trades, by maturity (in years)
This table presents the distribution of maturity, in years, of trades in US corporate dollar
denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation’s custody trades database, during the
period 1999-2004. The maturity of a bond is defined as the years remaining to maturity.
Bonds that trade in a given year, are sorted in the order of increasing maturity, and the
decile cutoff values are computed. The value shown is the maturity of the bond at the given
percentile. For example, the data shows that the median trade had a time to maturity of 6.4
years in 1999 and 5 years in 2004. 
Percentile 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
10
when-
issued
when-
issued
when-
issued
when-
issued 0.2 1.2
20 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.8 1.7
30 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.6 2.4
40 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.6 3
50 1.7 2.2 2.8 3.2 3.8 4.3
60 2.4 2.9 3.4 4 4.7 5.2
70 3.4 3.9 4.3 4.8 5.5 6
80 5.2 5.4 5.9 6.3 6.8 7
90 6.8 7.5 8.3 8.9 9.3 8.9
Table 7: Percentile distribution of trades, by age (in years) 
This table presents the distribution of age, in years, of trades in US corporate dollar
denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation’s custody trades database, during the
period 1999-2004. The age of a bond is defined as the number of years since its issue. Bonds
that trade in a given year, are sorted in the order of increasing age, and the decile cutoff
values are computed. The value shown is the age of the bond at the given percentile. For
example, the data shows that the median trade had an age of 1.7 years in 1999 and 4.3
years in 2004. 
Percentile 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
10 25 25 35 50 70 100
20 60 75 99 100 100 150
30 100 100 100 135 150 200
40 110 125 150 153 200 227
50 150 150 175 200 220 272
60 180 200 200 250 260 300
70 200 250 250 300 316 400
80 250 300 302 400 500 500
90 350 450 500 600 750 950
Table 8: Percentile distribution of trades, by face value  (millions of US dollars)
This table presents the distribution of face value (in millions of US Dollars) of trades in US
corporate dollar denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation’s custody trades
database, during the period 1999-2004. The face value of a bond is defined as the amount
outstanding on the trade date. Bonds that trade in a given year, are sorted in the order of
increasing face amount and the decile cutoff values are computed. The value shown is the
average face value of the bond for the given percentile. For example, the data shows that the
median trade had a face value of 150 million dollars in 1999 and 272  million dollars in 2004.      
Percentile 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
10 23 20 15 12 11 12
20 38 35 26 20 18 19
30 55 52 40 31 28 28
40 76 74 59 47 43 41
50 103 100 83 69 62 58
60 134 131 114 95 88 85
70 192 175 147 133 128 123
80 252 252 251 249 199 171
90 252 252 251 252 252 253
Table 9: Percentile distribution of trades, by time elapsed
between successive trades (in days)
This table presents the distribution of time elapsed between trades (in days) of trades in US
corporate dollar denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation’s custody trades
database during the period 1999-2004. The time elapsed is defined as the number of days
between successive trades of a given bond. Bonds that trade in a given year, are sorted in
the order of increasing time elapsed and the decile cutoff values are computed. The values
shown are the average time elapsed of the bond for the given percentile range. For example,
the data shows that the median trade had a elapsed time of 103 days in 1999 between
successive trades and 58 days in 2004.      
Figure 1. Latent liquidity rating as a function of bond age
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This figure presents the pattern of changes in the latent liquidity with respect to age of bond
(in years), of trades in US corporate dollar denominated bonds, in the State Street
Corporation’s custody trades database, during the period 1999-2004. The latent liquidity of a
bond is defined as the aggregate weighted-average level of turnover of the investors holding the
bond. The age of a bond is defined as the number of years since issue. The values of the latent
liquidity rating vary between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the highest liquidity level and 5 the
lowest liquidity level.        
Figure 2. Latent liquidity rating as a function of issue size
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This figure presents the pattern of changes in latent liquidity with respect to issue size (in
billions of US Dollars), of trades in US corporate dollar denominated bonds, in the State Street
Corporation’s custody trades database, during the period 1999-2004. The latent liquidity of a
bond is defined as the aggregate weighted-average level of turnover of the investors holding the
bond. The values of the latent liquidity rating vary between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the
highest liquidity level and 5 the lowest liquidity level. Issue size is defined as the amount of
principal at issuance.          
Figure 3. Latent liquidity as a function of maturity
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This figure presents the pattern of changes in latent liquidity with respect to time to maturity
(in years), of trades in US corporate dollar denominated bonds, in the State Street
Corporation’s custody trades database database, during the period 1999-2004.The latent
liquidity of a bond is defined as the aggregate weighted-average level of turnover of the
investors holding the bond. The age of a bond is defined as the number of years since the issue
date. The values of the latent liquidity rating vary between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the
highest liquidity level and 5 the lowest liquidity level.        
Figure 4. Latent liquidity as a function of coupon
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This figure presents the pattern of changes in latent liquidity with respect to coupon (in %)
of trades in US corporate dollar denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation’s
custody trades database database, during the period 1999-2004. The latent liquidity of a
bond is defined as the aggregate weighted-average level of turnover of the investors holding
the bond. The coupon is defined as the annual payment in relation to the principal amount
of the bond. The values of the latent liquidity rating vary between 1 and 5, where 1
represents the highest liquidity level and 5 the lowest liquidity level.         
Figure 5: Latent Liquidity as a function of Moodys Rating Categories
This figure gives the average value of latent liquidity for various Moody’s Credit rating categories,
in US corporate dollar denominated bonds, in the State Street Corporation’s custody trades
database, during the period 1999-2004. The latent liquidity of a bond is defined as the aggregate
weighted-average level of turnover of the investors holding the bond. The values of the latent
liquidity rating vary between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the highest liquidity level and 5 the
lowest liquidity level. 
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Latent Liquidity Trade Days Trade Count Traded Market Value
Latent Liquidity 1.00 0.33 0.34 0.27
Trade Days 1.00 0.99 0.72
Trade Count 1.00 0.73
Traded Market Value 1.00
Table 10: Correlation between various Liquidity Measures
This table presents the correlation between the various measures of liquidity. The measures of liquidity are latent liquidity, trade
days, trade count and traded market value. Each of the the measures is expressed as a percentile. These variables are calculated
from a set of US corporate bonds, that traded at least once during a calendar year, in the State Street Corporation’s custody
trades database. To calculate the latent liquidity percentile, latent liquidity values are identified as of first trade date of year.
These values are arranged in increasing order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher latent liquidity
percentile value indicates higher liquidity. To calculate the number of trade days percentile, we first divide the number of trades
for the given issue in the given year, by the amount outstanding as of the first trade day for that year. These normalized values
are arranged in increasing order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher trade days percentile value
indicates higher liquidity. To calculate the trade count percentile (the dependent variable), we first divide the number of trades
for the given issue in the given year, by the amount outstanding as of the first trade day for that year. These normalized values
are arranged in increasing order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher trade count percentile value
indicates higher liquidity. To calculate the trade market value percentile, we first divide the total market value of trades for the
given issue in the given year, by the amount outstanding as of the first trade day for that year. These normalized values are
arranged in increasing order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher trade market value percentile value
indicates higher liquidity.
Regression Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004
Constant 0.354 0.435 0.382 0.365 0.32 0.2 0.327
(12.469) (15.480) (13.263) (13.525) (12.547) (8.980) (28.551)
Industrial Sector (dummy) -0.048 -0.013 -0.052 -0.051 -0.054 -0.029 -0.041
(-4.146) (-1.075) (-4.217) (-4.588) (-5.051) (-2.876) (-8.855)
Financial Sector (dummy) 0.001 0.026 -0.013 -0.007 -0.013 -0.005 -0.002
(0.049) (1.999) (-0.987) (-0.622) (-1.102) (-0.425) (-0.330)
Utility Sector (dummy) -0.056 -0.02 -0.015 -0.033 -0.023 -0.012 -0.024
(-3.903) (-1.351) (-1.061) (-2.446) (-1.758) (-0.972) (-4.198)
Credit Rating (Moodys) rank 0.027 0.007 -0.003 0.015 0.032 0.071 0.028
(5.228) (1.447) (-0.606) (3.418) (7.205) (17.437) (14.941)
Age of Bond in years -0.022 -0.022 -0.017 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021
(-18.092) (-17.422) (-14.473) (-16.163) (-16.983) (-19.040) (-42.291)
Original Maturity 5 year (dummy) 0.091 0.098 0.091 0.077 0.086 0.071 0.084
(6.218) (7.353) (6.862) (6.263) (7.306) (6.424) (16.428)
Original Maturity 7 year (dummy) 0.068 0.045 0.049 0.037 0.034 0.067 0.051
(5.050) (3.220) (3.483) (2.751) (2.566) (5.383) (9.236)
Original Maturity 30 year (dummy) -0.095 -0.042 -0.048 -0.023 -0.048 -0.013 -0.046
(-6.651) (-2.730) (-3.147) (-1.574) (-3.433) (-0.981) (-7.698)
Amount Outstanding ($Billions) 0.007 0.03 0.031 0.122 0.1 0.076 0.06
(0.491) (2.136) (2.147) (8.610) (7.248) (5.979) (10.660)
Callable (dummy) 0.077 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.008 -0.048 0.019
Table 11: Liquidity regression on the traded set using latent liquidity as the measure of liquidity
This table presents the results of a multiple regression where latent liquidity (expressed as a percentile) is the dependent
variable. The numbers in each cell represent the regression coefficients for the independent variables in the first column with the
t -statistic in parenthesis. The independent variables are shown in the first column under the heading 'regression variables. The
credit rating is Moody’s rating represented as a quintile (number 1 through 5), with Aaa being 1 and below Baa3 being 5. These
variables are identified as of the first trade of the year. The regression analysis is performed each year for a set of US corporate
bonds that traded at least once during the year, in the State Street Corporation’s custody trades database. The last column
provides the results for the sample pooled across the years 1999-2004. To calculate the latent liquidity percentile (the dependent
variable), latent liquidity values are identified as of first trade date of year. These values are arranged in increasing order, for a
given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher latent liquidity percentile value indicates higher liquidity.
Regression Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004
(7.937) (3.812) (3.863) (3.750) (0.970) (-6.211) (5.126)
Putable (dummy) 0.081 0.085 0.116 0.094 0.082 0.101 0.092
(3.444) (3.425) (4.528) (3.777) (3.321) (4.120) (9.170)
Convertible (dummy) 0.1 0.056 0.203 0.147 0.172 0.072 0.129
(3.792) (1.850) (7.169) (5.461) (6.877) (2.734) (11.964)
Sinkable (dummy) 0.043 0.021 -0.005 0.025 -0.002 -0.014 0.011
(1.823) (0.876) (-0.206) (1.143) (-0.100) (-0.633) (1.242)
Float (dummy) -0.006 -0.075 0.044 0.004 -0.016 0.029 -0.002
(-0.246) (-3.235) (1.915) (0.187) (-0.731) (1.732) (-0.225)
Not semi-annual coupon (dummy) 0.01 0.006 0.097 0.032 0.07 0.071 0.05
(0.417) (0.264) (4.261) (1.579) (3.586) (4.244) (5.948)
Time to Maturity in years 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2.185) (0.459) (0.581) (0.137) (0.089) (0.296) (1.987)
Coupon 0.011 0.009 0.02 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.012
(4.097) (3.380) (7.487) (4.339) (5.389) (6.382) (11.930)
Adj-R2 0.184 0.111 0.118 0.158 0.173 0.191 0.144
R2 0.188 0.114 0.121 0.160 0.176 0.193 0.144
F 61.996 37.909 40.148 58.948 69.339 87.530 242.266
p -Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 4585 5012 4968 5265 5548 6225 31603
Table 11: Liquidity regression on the traded set using latent liquidity as the measure of liquidity (conitinued)
Regression Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004
Constant 0.438 0.337 0.425 0.315 0.245 0.31 0.337
(16.420) (12.930) (15.873) (12.769) (10.649) (14.881) (31.849)
Industrial Sector (dummy) -0.034 -0.043 -0.054 -0.057 -0.041 -0.035 -0.045
(-3.127) (-3.896) (-4.712) (-5.591) (-4.305) (-3.780) (-10.607)
Financial Sector (dummy) -0.048 -0.038 -0.067 -0.069 -0.051 -0.05 -0.053
(-4.035) (-3.100) (-5.492) (-6.315) (-4.896) (-5.012) (-11.615)
Utility Sector (dummy) -0.057 -0.06 -0.086 -0.142 -0.097 -0.088 -0.088
(-4.286) (-4.347) (-6.360) (-11.402) (-8.327) (-7.710) (-17.018)
Credit Rating (Moodys) rank 0.067 0.071 0.063 0.077 0.084 0.086 0.076
(13.962) (15.103) (13.825) (18.835) (21.124) (22.526) (43.503)
Age of Bond in years -0.016 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.019 -0.021 -0.016
(-13.705) (-11.143) (-12.599) (-11.845) (-16.616) (-19.918) (-35.117)
Original Maturity 5 year (dummy) 0.004 0.017 -0.006 -0.005 -0.017 -0.007 0.003
(0.297) (1.377) (-0.526) (-0.430) (-1.598) (-0.652) (0.590)
Original Maturity 7 year (dummy) -0.012 0.006 0.019 0.003 0.008 0.025 0.009
(-0.914) (0.465) (1.436) (0.258) (0.707) (2.113) (1.765)
Original Maturity 30 year (dummy)-0.064 -0.039 -0.006 0.01 -0.009 0.004 -0.018
(-4.777) (-2.784) (-0.396) (0.712) (-0.737) (0.293) (-3.192)
Amount Outstanding ($Billions) -0.185 -0.119 -0.132 -0.035 -0.003 0.014 -0.074
(-14.207) (-9.160) (-9.988) (-2.741) (-0.241) (1.139) (-14.334)
Callable (dummy) 0.061 0.041 0.057 0.049 0.034 -0.001 0.04
(6.692) (4.616) (6.467) (5.994) (4.377) (-0.078) (11.647)
Table 12: Liquidity regression on the traded set using trade days as the measure of liquidity
This table presents the results of a multiple regression where number of trade days (expressed as a percentile) is the dependent
variable.The numbers in each cell represent the regression coefficients for the independent variables in the first column with the
t -statistic in parenthesis. The independent variables are shown in the first column under the heading 'Regression Variables.
The credit rating is Moody’s rating represented as a quintile (number 1 through 5), with Aaa being 1 and below Baa3 being 5.
These variables are identified as of first trade of year. The regression analysis is performed each year for a set of US corporate
bonds that traded at least once during the year, in the State Street'Corporation’s custody trades database. The last column
provides the results for the sample pooled across the years 1999-2004. To calculate number of trade days percentile (the
dependent variable), we first divide the number of trades for the given issue in the given year, by the amount outstanding as of
the first trade day for that year. These normalized values are arranged in increasing order, for a given year and a percentile
number is calculated. A higher trade days percentile value indicates higher liquidity.       
Regression Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004
Putable (dummy) -0.029 -0.046 -0.004 -0.041 -0.052 -0.042 -0.053
(-1.337) (-1.990) (-0.182) (-1.810) (-2.334) (-1.830) (-5.697)
Convertible (dummy) 0.048 -0.014 -0.043 -0.124 -0.098 -0.155 -0.072
(1.933) (-0.508) (-1.651) (-5.033) (-4.324) (-6.308) (-7.247)
Sinkable (dummy) 0.013 -0.065 -0.108 -0.092 -0.095 -0.034 -0.066
(0.584) (-2.851) (-5.131) (-4.622) (-4.800) (-1.715) (-7.682)
Float (dummy) -0.099 -0.024 -0.013 -0.048 -0.078 -0.075 -0.043
(-4.528) (-1.133) (-0.589) (-2.420) (-3.965) (-4.694) (-5.461)
Not semi-annual coupon (dummy) -0.01 -0.023 -0.064 -0.06 -0.049 -0.077 -0.061
(-0.442) (-1.081) (-2.998) (-3.253) (-2.758) (-4.925) (-7.868)
Time to Maturity in years -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.425) (-3.334) (-2.291) (-2.787) (-0.838) (-2.211) (-5.444)
Coupon 0.001 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.003 0.005
(0.355) (3.611) (1.967) (3.172) (5.043) (1.743) (5.328)
Adj-R2 0.261 0.215 0.224 0.284 0.313 0.278 0.251
R2 0.264 0.218 0.227 0.287 0.315 0.280 0.252
F 96.292 81.654 85.432 124.064 149.807 142.180 483.509
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Count 4585 5012 4968 5265 5548 6225 31603
Table 12: Liquidity regression on the traded set using trade days as the measure of liquidity (continued)
Regression Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004
Constant 0.392 0.294 0.358 0.254 0.178 0.24 0.276
(14.799) (11.347) (13.480) (10.467) (7.836) (11.725) (26.353)
Industrial Sector (dummy) -0.033 -0.045 -0.055 -0.06 -0.041 -0.036 -0.046
(-3.105) (-4.040) (-4.874) (-5.996) (-4.369) (-3.961) (-10.985)
Financial Sector (dummy) -0.049 -0.039 -0.066 -0.07 -0.044 -0.046 -0.051
(-4.107) (-3.214) (-5.428) (-6.441) (-4.295) (-4.691) (-11.279)
Utility Sector (dummy) -0.057 -0.057 -0.083 -0.134 -0.089 -0.085 -0.084
(-4.307) (-4.164) (-6.137) (-10.943) (-7.702) (-7.588) (-16.341)
Credit Rating (Moodys) 0.071 0.075 0.068 0.082 0.089 0.091 0.081
(14.887) (16.077) (15.050) (20.293) (22.641) (24.482) (46.794)
Age of Bond -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.019 -0.021 -0.017
(-14.063) (-11.649) (-13.076) (-12.373) (-16.773) (-20.448) (-36.122)
Original Maturity 5 year 0.003 0.015 -0.004 -0.002 -0.019 -0.01 0.003
(0.223) (1.259) (-0.310) (-0.212) (-1.853) (-1.003) (0.545)
Original Maturity 7 year -0.008 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.006 0.019 0.006
(-0.671) (0.131) (1.203) (0.103) (0.479) (1.671) (1.286)
Original Maturity 30 year -0.064 -0.035 -0.001 0.008 -0.015 0.002 -0.017
(-4.797) (-2.467) (-0.046) (0.595) (-1.162) (0.162) (-3.211)
Amount Outstanding -0.149 -0.087 -0.086 0.016 0.045 0.058 -0.031
(-11.534) (-6.792) (-6.525) (1.297) (3.674) (5.018) (-6.102)
Callable (dummy) 0.065 0.045 0.057 0.053 0.037 0.002 0.042
(7.129) (5.113) (6.612) (6.467) (4.793) (0.252) (12.619)
Table 13: Liquidity regression on traded set using trade count as the measure of liquidity
This table presents the results of a multiple regression where trade count (expressed as a percentile) is the dependent variable.
The numbers in each cell represent the regression coefficients for the independent variables in the first column with the t
statistic in parenthesis. The independent variables are shown in the first column under the heading 'Regression Variables. The
credit rating is Moody’s rating represented as a quintile (number 1 through 5), with Aaa being 1 and below Baa3 being 5. These
variables are identified as of first trade of year. The regression analysis is performed each year for a set of US corporate bonds
that traded at least once in the State Street Corporation’s custody trades database. The last column provides the results for the
sample pooled across the years 1999-2004. To calculate the trade count percentile (the dependent variable), we first divide the
number of trades for the given issue in the given year, by the amount outstanding as of the first trade day for that year. These
normalized values are arranged in increasing order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher trade count
percentile value indicates higher liquidity.
Regression Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004
Putable (dummy) -0.028 -0.047 -0.008 -0.032 -0.056 -0.032 -0.051
(-1.274) (-2.031) (-0.339) (-1.447) (-2.544) (-1.423) (-5.632)
Convertible (dummy) 0.058 -0.021 -0.032 -0.13 -0.097 -0.159 -0.071
(2.344) (-0.753) (-1.234) (-5.370) (-4.344) (-6.610) (-7.209)
Sinkable (dummy) 0.03 -0.033 -0.091 -0.08 -0.078 -0.012 -0.046
(1.385) (-1.475) (-4.357) (-4.034) (-4.003) (-0.628) (-5.436)
Float (dummy) -0.09 -0.013 -0.003 -0.03 -0.072 -0.073 -0.034
(-4.142) (-0.616) (-0.139) (-1.561) (-3.750) (-4.678) (-4.301)
Not semi-annual coupon (dummy) -0.01 -0.018 -0.051 -0.061 -0.04 -0.072 -0.056
(-0.456) (-0.861) (-2.423) (-3.373) (-2.315) (-4.682) (-7.323)
Time to Maturity in years 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.029) (-2.885) (-1.837) (-2.322) (-0.244) (-1.775) (-4.332)
Coupon 0.002 0.01 0.008 0.009 0.013 0.007 0.007
(0.764) (4.067) (3.038) (3.983) (6.144) (3.352) (7.530)
Adj-R2 0.270 0.224 0.235 0.305 0.333 0.305 0.267
R2 0.273 0.227 0.237 0.307 0.335 0.307 0.268
F 100.826 86.221 90.560 136.670 163.964 161.942 525.295
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Count 4585 5012 4968 5265 5548 6225 31603
Table 13: Liquidity regression on traded set using trade count as the measure of liquidity (continued)
Regression Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004
Constant 0.505 0.418 0.504 0.421 0.271 0.324 0.395
(16.708) (14.634) (17.074) (15.503) (10.858) (14.557) (34.030)
Industrial Sector (dummy) -0.029 -0.031 -0.026 -0.048 -0.051 -0.041 -0.04
(-2.385) (-2.559) (-2.076) (-4.328) (-4.889) (-4.097) (-8.512)
Financial Sector (dummy) -0.037 -0.017 -0.034 -0.069 -0.046 -0.052 -0.042
(-2.761) (-1.286) (-2.549) (-5.679) (-4.071) (-4.903) (-8.389)
Utility Sector (dummy) -0.016 -0.015 -0.045 -0.119 -0.095 -0.096 -0.067
(-1.047) (-1.023) (-3.030) (-8.706) (-7.499) (-7.925) (-11.843)
Credit Rating (Moodys) 0.026 0.035 0.028 0.046 0.066 0.06 0.046
(4.788) (6.838) (5.658) (10.208) (15.387) (14.718) (24.118)
Age of Bond -0.019 -0.017 -0.013 -0.014 -0.018 -0.021 -0.017
(-14.341) (-12.839) (-11.058) (-10.465) (-14.692) (-18.179) (-32.748)
Original Maturity 5 year -0.014 0.015 -0.003 -0.01 -0.026 -0.006 -0.002
(-0.919) (1.099) (-0.230) (-0.813) (-2.248) (-0.553) (-0.426)
Original Maturity 7 year -0.024 -0.013 -0.014 -0.016 -0.003 0.004 -0.008
(-1.647) (-0.920) (-0.976) (-1.224) (-0.233) (0.298) (-1.448)
Original Maturity 30 year -0.009 0.02 0.034 0.026 0.009 0.033 0.019
(-0.606) (1.291) (2.146) (1.755) (0.690) (2.413) (3.191)
Amount Outstanding -0.007 0.061 0.061 0.134 0.15 0.175 0.095
(-0.485) (4.311) (4.155) (9.406) (11.145) (13.785) (16.802)
Callable (dummy) 0.012 -0.022 0 0.012 0.015 -0.024 -0.001
(1.204) (-2.313) (-0.013) (1.282) (1.832) (-3.092) (-0.150)
Putable (dummy) -0.058 -0.008 0 -0.06 -0.072 -0.038 -0.049
Table 14: Liquidity regression on traded set using traded market value as the measure of liquidity
This table presents the results of a multiple regression where trade market value (expressed as a percentile) is the dependent
variable. The numbers in each cell represent the regression coefficients for the independent variables in the first column with the t
statistic in parenthesis. The independent variables are shown in the first column under the heading 'Regression Variables. The
credit rating is Moody’s rating represented as a quintile (number 1 through 5), with Aaa being 1 and below Baa3 being 5. These
variables are identified as of first trade of year. The regression analysis is performed each year for a set of US corporate bonds
that traded at least once from the State Street Corporation’s custody trades database. The last column provides the results for the
sample pooled across the years 1999-2004. To calculate the trade market value percentile (the dependent variable), we first divide
the total market value of trades for the given issue in the given year, by the amount outstanding as of the first trade day for that
year. These normalized values are arranged in increasing order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher
trade market value percentile value indicates higher liquidity.
Regression Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004
(-2.314) (-0.330) (0.001) (-2.388) (-3.010) (-1.545) (-4.863)
Convertible (dummy) -0.12 -0.178 -0.199 -0.262 -0.235 -0.233 -0.213
(-4.266) (-5.793) (-6.872) (-9.631) (-9.591) (-8.897) (-19.500)
Sinkable (dummy) 0.016 -0.04 -0.103 -0.109 -0.102 -0.044 -0.07
(0.645) (-1.592) (-4.443) (-4.959) (-4.745) (-2.038) (-7.512)
Float (dummy) 0.016 0.105 0.122 0.095 0.032 0.023 0.074
(0.652) (4.439) (5.158) (4.361) (1.526) (1.335) (8.510)
Not semi-annual coupon (dummy) 0.025 -0.018 -0.051 -0.074 -0.008 -0.003 -0.027
(0.989) (-0.764) (-2.170) (-3.628) (-0.396) (-0.204) (-3.224)
Time to Maturity in years 0 -0.002 0 0 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.188) (-3.473) (-1.032) (-0.490) (1.394) (-2.739) (-2.661)
Coupon -0.001 0.003 -0.007 -0.005 0.004 0.003 -0.002
(-0.464) (0.948) (-2.452) (-1.912) (1.745) (1.403) (-1.572)
Adj-R2 0.079 0.081 0.076 0.146 0.211 0.191 0.121
R2 0.082 0.084 0.079 0.149 0.213 0.194 0.121
F 24.063 26.916 24.956 53.943 88.060 87.659 197.939
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Count 4585 5012 4968 5265 5548 6225 31603
Table 14: Liquidity regression on traded set using traded market value as the measure of liquidity (continued)
Regression Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004
Constant 0.276 0.281 0.257 0.245 0.243 0.151 0.23084109
(13.162) (13.249) (11.756) (11.797) (11.455) (7.820) 25.832248
Industrial Sector (dummy) -0.059 -0.028 -0.044 -0.042 -0.051 -0.026 -0.04171465
(-6.531) (-3.063) (-4.746) (-4.779) (-5.624) (-2.959) -11.22302
Financial Sector (dummy) 0.02 0.028 0.003 0.019 0.007 -0.001 0.013838924
(2.138) (2.810) (0.282) (2.013) (0.700) (-0.072) 3.4872585
Utility Sector (dummy) -0.074 -0.04 -0.035 -0.04 -0.041 -0.014 -0.03844475
(-6.945) (-3.677) (-3.240) (-3.889) (-3.871) (-1.325) -8.8542606
Credit Rating (Moodys) 0.038 0.02 0.016 0.022 0.027 0.067 0.033548958
(10.376) (5.563) (4.488) (6.488) (8.020) (20.332) 23.405323
Age of Bond -0.015 -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.01306762
(-19.576) (-17.875) (-14.305) (-15.010) (-14.427) (-14.523) -39.482223
Original Maturity 5 year 0.1 0.11 0.135 0.076 0.089 0.084 0.098703342
(9.545) (10.319) (11.617) (6.995) (8.353) (8.278) 22.549942
Original Maturity 7 year 0.083 0.074 0.086 0.034 0.044 0.063 0.064407096
(8.290) (6.863) (7.768) (3.173) (3.849) (5.541) 14.446537
Original Maturity 30 year -0.107 -0.072 -0.071 -0.043 -0.041 -0.021 -0.05714518
(-10.300) (-6.921) (-6.863) (-4.232) (-3.982) (-2.013) -13.51844
Amount Outstanding 0.059 0.125 0.144 0.209 0.166 0.128 0.13477524
(5.700) (12.019) (13.527) (19.213) (14.467) (11.665) 30.803701
Table 15: Liquidity regression on the full US corporate holding data set using using 
latent liquidity as the measure of liquidity
This table presents the results of a multiple regression where latent liquidity (expressed as a percentile) is the dependent
variable. The numbers in each cell represent the regression coefficients for the independent variables in the first column
with the t -statistic in parenthesis. The independent variables are shown in the first column under the heading 'Regression
Variables. The credit rating is Moody’s rating represented as a quintile (number 1 through 5), with Aaa being 1 and
below Baa3 being 5. These variables are identified as of the first trade of the year. The regression analysis is performed
each year for the full set of US corporate bonds in State Street Corporation’s custody holdings database, including bonds
that did not trade in the calendar year. The last column provides the results for the sample pooled across the years 1999-
2004. To calculate the latent liquidity percentile (the dependent variable), latent liquidity values are identified as of first
trade date of year. These values are arranged in increasing order, for a given year and a percentile number is calculated. A 
higher latent liquidity percentile value indicates higher liquidity.
Regression Variables 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004
Callable (dummy) 0.103 0.065 0.037 0.042 0.03 -0.013 0.040723629
(14.427) (9.307) (5.360) (6.265) (4.281) (-1.988) 14.540825
Putable (dummy) 0.089 0.123 0.08 0.084 0.073 0.077 0.083759921
(5.638) (7.531) (4.921) (5.408) (4.502) (4.797) 12.897064
Convertible (dummy) 0.086 0.016 0.182 0.155 0.138 0.057 0.10590244
(4.382) (0.753) (8.762) (8.150) (7.424) (3.043) 13.554436
Sinkable (dummy) -0.01 -0.039 -0.02 -0.013 -0.015 -0.032 -0.02072865
(-0.723) (-2.673) (-1.425) (-0.904) (-1.059) (-2.165) -3.5405613
Float (dummy) -0.013 -0.057 -0.023 -0.004 0.019 0.04 -0.00566209
(-0.713) (-3.377) (-1.398) (-0.203) (1.046) (2.719) -0.82521363
Not semi-annual coupon (dummy)0.053 0.011 0.143 0.053 0.075 0.07 0.066194184
(2.608) (0.640) (8.576) (2.987) (4.653) (5.071) 9.8405547
Time to Maturity in years 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0 0.001 0.000531921
(3.477) (1.937) (1.608) (-1.586) (1.186) (1.447) 3.7347795
Coupon 0.01 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.012 0.013831687
(4.924) (6.914) (8.951) (7.298) (8.072) (6.620) 17.260734
Adj-R2 0.210 0.156 0.160 0.189 0.169 0.172 0.164
R2 0.212 0.158 0.162 0.190 0.171 0.174 0.165
F 128.323 93.818 92.365 114.755 96.386 105.095 443.966
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Count 8121 8533 8144 8321 7988 8515 49622
Table 15: Liquidity regression on the full US corporate holding data set using using 
latent liquidity as the measure of liquidity (continued)
Regression Variables Latent 
Liquidity
Constant 0.18306798
(12.378948)
Industrial Sector (dummy) -0.040301468
(-6.1629971)
Financial Sector (dummy) 0.027697603
(4.0245696)
Utility Sector (dummy) -0.031238385
(-4.3067682)
Credit Rating (Moodys) rank 0.035903312
(15.832037)
Age of Bond in years -0.005382361
(-11.537633)
Original Maturity 5 year (dummy) 0.10851874
(12.617593)
Original Maturity 7 year (dummy) 0.088299743
(11.206349)
Table 16: Liquidity panel regression on the non-traded set 
using latent liquidity as a measure of liquidity
This table presents the results of a multiple regression where latent liquidity (expressed as a
percentile) is the dependent variable. The numbers in each cell represent the regression
coefficients for the independent variables in the first column with the t -statistic in parenthesis.
The independent variables are shown in the first column under the heading 'Regression
Variables'. The credit rating is Moody’s rating represented as a quintile (number 1 through 5),
with Aaa being 1 and below Baa3 being 5. These variables are identified as of the first trade of
the year. The regression analyses is performed for the non-traded set (i.e. the ones that did not
even trade once a year) of US corporate bonds in State Street Corporation’s custody holdings
database. The table provides the results for the sample pooled across theyears 1999-2004. To
calculate the latent liquidity percentile (the dependent variable), latent liquidity values are
identified as of first trade date of year. These values are arranged in increasing order, for a
given year and a percentile number is calculated. A higher latent liquidity percentile value
indicates higher liquidity.
Regression Variables Latent 
Liquidity
Original Maturity 30 year (dummy) -0.05988744
(-9.5792708)
Amount Outstanding ($Billions) 0.045450888
(6.4001899)
Callable (dummy) 0.038663653
(8.4199134)
Putable (dummy) 0.12577787
(14.04388)
Convertible (dummy) 0.16017459
(13.314638)
Sinkable (dummy) -0.03561858
(-4.5375492)
Float (dummy) -0.029882273
(-2.5920672)
Not semi-annual coupon (dummy) 0.098980213
(8.7561688)
Time to Maturity in years 0.001250828
(5.6911709)
Coupon 0.021066615
(15.540587)
Adj-R2 0.12451941
R2 0.12554576
F 122.322
P-Value 0
Count 18767
Table 16: Liquidity panel regression on the non-traded set 
using latent liquidity as a measure of liquidity (continued)
